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CASTLES IN THE AIR,
WHERE IS THE DEMOCRACY PARACHUTE?
Paul J Carnegie
“Democracy is best understood as an implied condition and practical
consequence of philosophical - political pluralism. In essence it is not merely the
political juridical equality of isolated individuals but the total complex of social
decision making”
Mihaly Vajda
“I know you don’t know what life is really worth.
It’s not all that glitters is gold, half the story has never been told.”
Bob Marley
Introduction
In the following I explore the terrain of democracy. There will be at least three
aspects to the inquiry. On an analytical level I investigate the logical structure of
democracy and its relations, coupled with a deliberation on the philosophical or
ontological status of democracy. Following this I examine some of the normative
and practical dimensions of democratic discourse. To start with the process of
assigning  symbols  to  mean a  thing  or  an  idea  is  signification,  the  most
illuminating map of this process coming from the world of semiotics. Above all,
semiotics  is  a perspective that consists  in asking oneself  how things become
carriers  of  meaning.  This  becomes  problematic  from  the  perspective  of
contemporary capitalism as it does not need to construct a “centre” or “meaning”
to  operate  as  it  is  continually  transforming  through  a  process  of
“deterritorialization”  that  distinguishes  it  from  earlier  modes  of  production
(Deleuze  &  Guattari  1987:  241).  Therefore  how  applicable  the  signifier  and
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signified of “democratic discourse” is today open to question. However, as Gilles
Deleuze (1990: 19) notes, an ‘event’ is a bifurcator which unleashes an “emission
of singularities”; that is, it provides for a new set of attractors or patterns of
behaviour.  As  a  multiplicity  an  ‘event’  is  profoundly  social  and  collective,
therefore, irreducible to individual states of affairs, particular images or personal
beliefs. The terrain of democracy is woven into the circumstances that surround
situations or ‘events’ and give it meaning to something else and as such remains
an  open-ended  flow  subject  to  differing  interpretations.1 The  ‘event’  of
democracy should continually stimulate the imagination to transform democratic
futures by expanding our imagined worlds and what it is possible for us to think. 
This article is a journey into a theme that re-evaluates preconceptions and raises
the question: can a normative search for the ‘promises’  of the enlightenment
rescue a democracy without metaphysical foundations? 2  If so, what constitutes
the ‘promise’ of democracy? Jacques Derrida has referred to the ‘promise’ as a
radically open ended future; “la democratie a venir” - democracy to come. The
very structure of a ‘promise’ inscribes democracy with the ability to recreate and
re-perceive the world and our relationship to it (Derrida 1992: 78). 
Structured Values or Valued Structures?
“All that is Solid Melts into Air”
Karl Marx
1 Deleuze  &  Guattari  (1987)  utilise  the  “linguistics  of  flows”  instead  of  a  “linguistics  of  the
signifier” to analyse the semiotics of a capitalist society. ‘Ideas’ for them have a complex internal
structure or rhizome, being composed of a series of singularities. 
2  As Marcuse (1968: 117-118) notes, “essence and appearance, ‘is’ and ‘ought’ confront each
other in the conflict between actual forces and capabilities in the society. And they confront each
other, not as reason and unreason, right and wrong - for both are part and parcel of the same
established universe, both partaking of reason, unreason, right and wrong. The idea of reason
pertains to the movement of thought and of action. It is a theoretical and practical exigency”.
Dialogue (2005) 3:2 87
It is a fairly non-contentious claim that there are many different democracies in
the world. Some are similar, some are not, some are more recognisable than
others, all are by some definition imperfect and subject to ongoing processes of
change.  Although  Lijphart  (1975)  divides  existing  democracies  in  two  basic
models of majoritarian and consociational, one has only to consider democracy at
an elite-leadership level to realise that democratic regimes vary greatly according
to the  degree  of  separation  of  judicial,  legislative  and executive  power.  The
dispersal  or  separation  of  powers  rests  on  doubts  as  to  the  adequacy  of
executive supremacy and the need to protect the polity from its possible abuse
(Pennock  1979:  478-500).  Given  the  vast  array  of  existent  institutional
arrangements  called  democracy  then  differences  are  as  important  as  the
common ground. Therefore a crucial expression of democracy lies neither solely
in the similarities of state institutions nor the characteristics of society, but the
effective  interaction  with  one  another.  In  other  words,  a  ‘living  democracy’
becomes  the  habituated linkages  between  state  institutions  and society.  The
particular  arrangements  that  allow  channels  of  popular  control  and  political
equality to form are part of what David Held (1996) terms the broad project of
democratic autonomy. Held (1996:119-120) defines this as 
a cluster of rules and institutions permitting the broadest participation of
the majority of citizens in the selection of representatives who alone can
make political decisions…..this cluster includes elected government; free
and fair elections in which every citizens’ vote has an equal weight: a
suffrage which embraces all citizens irrespective of distinctions of race,
religion,  class,  sex  and  so  on,  freedom  of  conscience,  information,
expression on all public matters broadly defined: the right of all adults to
oppose  their  government  and  stand  for  office:  and  associational
autonomy - the right to form independent associations including social
movements, interest groups and political parties. 
The project and process is without ultimate solution, but as a condition should
mirror democratic values. Held’s concern is with extending popular control and
protecting political equality. Therefore the changing notions of liberty, equality
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and the ‘good-life’ and their connexion with what it is to be human ultimately
provide the measure of the condition. The linkages constituted between state
and  society  should  allow  people  to  effectively  access,  engage,  and  have  a
genuine degree of influence. 
However, the practical consequences that emerge from the implied condition of
democracy meld with cultural notions and values that vary in a spatial-temporal
sense  between  different  social  groupings.  Franz  Boas  once  defined  culture
broadly as, “the totality of the mental and physical reactions and activities that
characterise  the  behaviour  of  the  individuals  composing  a  social  group
collectively  and  individually  in  relation  to  their  natural  environment  to  other
groups to members of the group itself and each individual to herself” (1988:4).
Therefore, the symbolised understandings of perceptual meanings are constantly
open to change.3  Similarly ‘democracy’ is the mirror of this complex plurality and
signifies  a diverse range of political  systems, institutions, political  culture and
practice.  People  are  enmeshed  within  a  complex  linguistic  and  cultural  (re)
translation  of  democracy.  A  dynamic  process  of  interpretation  in  regards  to
inclusion,  suffrage,  minority  representation,  public  ethos,  socio-economic
preoccupation and geo-political orientation. The recurrent although discontinuous
theme of contestation plays out in reiterative and inter-subjective relationships
between culture and politics and between discourse and practice. The relational
aspect of such processes provides the possibility for differing interpretations and
practice (Mouffe 1988:90). An emergent democracy (re)constitutes through (re)
translation  with  the  nodes  of  contestation  immanent  in  any  political  system
undergoing a positional shift within the relationships of power (Foucault 1980:
194;  Laclau  &  Mouffe  1985:  105).   To  wit,  existing  systems  of  political
3 Deleuze & Guattari (1987) note that symbolised meaning is open to slippage, flowing within and
through a contextually embedded rhizome of power-knowledge.
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signification are capable of transformation. The challenge remains as always to
weave democratic autonomy into the texture of the imperfect mess of humanity.
The Democratic Condition
“There is no knowledge of true being. The world is fundamentally in a state of
becoming.”
Friedrich Nietzsche
However  the unsettling paradox of  the late-modern era is  that democracy is
today everywhere and nowhere. If democracy on a political institutional level is
measured  against  the  project  of  democratic  autonomy  its  ascendancy  to
respectability  has turned out  to be  a disappointment at  best  and at  worst  a
sham. We are currently living in an age of global economic integration with a
complex variety of forces and trends having brought paralysis to the democratic
imagination itself. The prognosis that the singular pursuit of competitive market
advantage is subsuming our political, social and environmental life-worlds to the
detriment  of  our  overall  well-being  is  beginning  to  gain  greater  credence
(Hamilton  2003;  Paehlke  2003).  In  short,  contemporary  democracy  can  be
distinguished by the existence of a largely passive citizenry compounded by the
erosion  and  displacement  of  parliamentary  institutions  by  unelected
concentrations of political and economic power. Governments silently acquiesce
to  the  power  interests  of  global  economic  bodies  and  trade  agreements  by
relinquishing  environmental  protections,  public  services  and  hard  fought  for
social programmes in the name of remaining globally competitive. The threat of
capital flight is hung like a sword of Damocles over elected governments with
progressive programmes of social reform. The consequences of this relentless
onslaught  sweep  across  societies  abetted  by  advertising  and  marketing  that
mediates the pervasive commodification of every aspect of our lives. 
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We no longer benefit from or develop the classic Athenian notion of an active
citizen, preferring instead to economise on direct experience having our desire to
participate satiated as largely passive recipients of mass communication.4 The
discrete addictions and fetishisms of consumer society have us habitually sedated
to a purely symbolic perception of public life that renders democracy virtual.5
Snared  in  a  chimerical  web  of  para-social  interaction  our  collective  will  has
become diffident. We have lost the habit of asking questions about established
beliefs and procedures. This apathy in our human ability to explore or conceive
of an authentic plurality of life-worlds both formal and informal, local and central,
temporary  and  permanent  has  us  congealed  within  an  increasingly  stagnant
orthodoxy. 
How did Occam’s razor get applied to Democracy?
“Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate”
(Plurality should not be posited without necessity)
William of Ockham (1285-
1349)
“To want control is the pathology.  Not that the person can get control, because
of course you never do... Man is only a part of larger systems, and the part can
never control the whole.”
Gregory Bateson 
What accounts for the malaise, this discontented ennui of our times? How did we
arrive  at  such  an impasse?  Although all  existing  democracies  are  necessarily
incomplete  and  imperfect,  its  very  name conjures  up  notions  of  a  rare  and
4 The idea of transmission, manipulative and hypodermic models of mass communication were
articulated by the likes of Adorno & Horkheimer ([1948] 1979) and Marcuse (1968).  
5 See Deleuze (1993 51-52) who notes that the main characteristic of this virtual is that it is self-
differentiating, or “difference in itself.” The virtual realm is not an undifferentiated chaos, but is
articulated by “ideas” which serve as “regional ontologies,” mapping the many ways in which ‘a’
society, ‘a’ language, ‘an’ animal, and so forth can exist. The world is an infinite series of folds
that permutates within extrinsic limits. The concept of the virtual is thus a way to understand the
relation of any system to the probabilities of its behaviours it designates the unilateral character
of inclusion.
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desirable  political  form.  The  complex  democratic  canon  has  been  (and  is)
continually influenced by changing circumstances and shaped by the capacious
history and traditions that intersect it. How have people conceived, represented
and  thought  about  democratic  concepts?  Do  notions  of  democracy  have  a
concomitant  responsibility  to  acknowledge  that  they  are  neither  static  nor
unchallenged but a continually changing process of representations, differences,
hybridisations,  contradictions,  ambiguities  and conflicts?  If  cultures  are multi-
layered and complex manifestations what then constitutes a democratic polity?
What is the relationship between democracy and modernity and what are the
major assumptions about the nature of democratic polities? 
Democratic  traditions  trace  back  some 2500  years  in  the  history  of  western
philosophy from Ancient Greece and the time of Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle
through to the enlightenment epoch of Locke, Hume, Kant, Rousseau and onto
Hegel.  However  the  general  commitment  to  democracy  is  a  fairly  recent
phenomenon  and  from  Plato  to  Hobbes  ‘democracy’  was  often  held  as  a
pejorative term to be viewed with suspicion (Held 1996: 28-32). As a normative
term laden with value judgements and assumptions as to substantive definition it
remains a ‘promise’  that has proven ever vulnerable; a praxis project without
ultimate solution. In this next section I explore aspects of the democratic canon
to illuminate this complex puzzle. 
The  work  of  the  likes  of  Robert  Michels  and  Max  Weber  provide  a  strong
rationale and the antecedents for contemporary understandings of competitive
elitist democracy.6 Their work was later re-articulated and developed in America
6 See Michels ([1915] 1959) and Weber ([1927] in  Roth & Wittich 1968). Weber’s work was a
critique of socialism and challenge to Marx and Engels and their explanations of the processes of
modernity and bureaucratisation. Weber did not view the state and bureaucratic organisations as
parasitic and thought direct participatory democracy was an unsuitable mechanism for mediating
the struggles of factions and therefore an inappropriate model for general political regulation and
control. 
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by the likes of Joseph Schumpeter (1943) and Robert Dahl (1971). The thread
running through them all is a focus on choosing decision makers and curbing
their  excesses  by  positing  very  particular  forms  of  political  arrangements.
Schumpeter (1943: 269) describes and seeks to explain democracy in minimal
and  instrumental  terms  as  a  procedural  mechanism  for  conferring  legitimate
authority  or,  “that  particular  institutional  arrangement  for  arriving  at  political
decisions  in  which  individuals  acquire  the  power  to  decide  by  means  of  a
competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. 
Given that Schumpeter was an economist by trade, the analogy of entrepreneurs
competing for customers and using the techniques of advertisers is strong. We
see  here  an  extension  of  Max  Weber’s  notion  of  plebiscitary  leadership
democracy  where  ‘people’  are  producers  of  governments  and  contemporary
democracy was fully enmeshed with the project of modernity. His sociological
explanation highlighted that in an era of mass politics, the development of mass
franchise, electoral politics and bureaucratic organisation modern democracy was
a process of choosing decision makers and curbing their excesses (Weber [1927]
in Roth & Wittich 1968:  141-4). For Weber this was an inevitable condition of
living  in  modern  industrial  society,  “the  decisive  reason  for  the  advance  of
bureaucratic organisation has always been its purely technical superiority over
any other form of organisation” (Weber [1927] in Roth & Wittich 1968: 973).
However,  this  protective  form of  competitive  elitism or  leadership  democracy
gives  little  scope  for  considering  the  role  of  democratic  participation  and
individual  or  collective development.  The inherent  positivism of Weber’s  work
justifies  a technocratic consciousness devoid of imaginative impulse that pays
little  notice  to  the  surrounding  social  context  in  which  activities  take  place
(Bachrach 1968: 36-8). 
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If we accept Weberian-infused positivism as the way things are, this tends to
become an undefended celebration of existing social arrangements or the status
quo ante. Democracy is no longer seen as functioning as an ideal in itself or an
end  in  itself  but  merely  a  means  to  particular  ends.  Construed  in  implied
instrumental and protective terms it is a procedure for arriving at decisions that
severely curtails the normative impulse of democracy as socio-political trope. It
no longer becomes a measure of broader values within an ideational landscape
but operates in the essential, though limited, capacity as a protective mechanism
for organising authority to prevent the ‘tyranny of the majority’ and check official
representatives abusing state power. The sanction and legitimacy of authority or
rule becomes predicated on the production of an accountable, feasible and stable
government in modern industrial capitalist societies. 
Schumpeterian democracy tends to view the installation of elections in a country
as  enough  to  warrant  the  classification  of  democracy  and  with  it  the
accompanying  advantageous  inference  of  legitimacy. Although  there  is  no
argument that the election of representatives is a procedural necessity it does
not negate the fact that is far from a sufficient condition for a healthy democracy
(Bermeo 1990: 359-77; Carothers 2002: 5-21). It is impossible to assume that
elections in and of themselves effectively channel political action into peaceful
contests and accord public legitimacy. To do so unintentionally ignores the issue
of civil liberties and the deleterious effects to democratic mechanisms of political
juridical  equality  posed  by  powerful  asymmetries  of  economic  interest  and
wealth.7  
Now obviously this is a piece of rhetorical reductionism and not the whole story.
Robert  Dahl’s  (1971)  criteria  based  “polyarchy”  is  a  more  familiar  outline  of
7 A closer reading of Schumpeter (1943: 249-69) does reveal his own awareness as to the threats
of erosion to the democratic mechanism. Elections are not the sine qua non of democracy but the
unintentional rhetorical consequences of his circumscribed conceptualisation remain.
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democracy for many.8 His definitions of minimal institutional guarantees include
elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage and the right to run for
office, freedom of expression, alternative information and associational autonomy
(Dahl 1971: 3). It fits well with the economic principles of Adam Smith (1776)
and David Ricardo (1817) and leading early advocates of this type of protective
representative government, James Madison and Alexis de Tocqueville.9 
However if we accept that a critical  aspect of democracy is neither the state
institutions nor the characteristics of society in isolation from one another, but
how  the  two  interact  with  one  another  then  other  considerations  arise.  As
mentioned earlier, if democracy manifests in many respects from the habituated
linkages between state institutions and the nature of a particular society then
qualitatively it is the peoples’ ability to access, utilise and have a genuine degree
of influence via the linkages.  It  is this relationship that provides a significant
measure  of  a  living  ‘democracy’.  Although  pluralist  conceptions  provide
guarantee to formally  disperse  power to protect  the  ‘individual’  the ability  to
conceive of the de jure and de facto dimensions of ‘democracy’ is limited. 
Unintentionally conceptualising power as non-relational misses the ‘interaction’ of
demos with  kratos.10 It  is  not  what  is  said  but  what  is  left  out  of  pluralist
conceptions of the distribution of power and the asymmetries in economic and
political  resources.  Contemporary corporate  capitalism  tends  to  produce
inequalities in social and economic resources so great as to bring about severe
8 Polyarchy etymologically speaking is ‘multiple’ ‘power’ or “government by the many” reflected in
contemporary democratic  institutions by the separation of powers as between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of government producing a compound or constitutive form of rule
or leadership that has legitimate authority.
9 In The Federalist No. 10 Madison famously states that, “the latent causes of faction are sown in
the nature for man” ([1787] 1961: 79). See Madison ([1787] 1961: 77-84) and de Tocqueville
([1824] 1972) for the utility of this  type of political  formation as safeguard against  domestic
factionalism and insurrection.
10 ‘Demos’  (people)  ‘kratos’  (power/rule/authority)  are  the  etymological  roots  of  the  Greek
demokratia (democracy).
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violations of political equality in the democratic process and is vastly deleterious
to the health of existing pluralist arrangements of representative democracy. Our
present  institutional  arrangements  guarantee  and  protect  individual  liberties
against the ‘tyranny of the majority’  by quelling the rise of  demos to  kratos.
Despite the fact the people in a democracy  are the source of legitimacy and
power little concern is shown about the processes of domination by kratos over
demos. The annexing of political decision making to corporate interests corrodes
the public sphere and any notion of common political life. We bear witness to the
constant undermining of the structures of participation in local society and in the
workplace. 
The Hobbesian assumption would be that whatever is beneficial for the order of
the political system as a whole is beneficial for the individuals within it. Order,
stability  and  control  of  existing  social,  economic  and  political  arrangements
becomes  privileged  above  all  else.11 This  implies  that  apathy  and  restricted
participation are actually beneficial to the system and the classical conception of
participation as having intrinsic value is subverted.  However, if  order, stability
and  control  are  accepted  as  sine  qua  non to  a  democratic  system  then  it
becomes  difficult  to  question  or  examine  the  nature  of  the  set  of  social,
economic and political relations being stabilised and our position within them. To
unreflectively  ignore the vicious circles of  non-participation, whereby effective
participation requires political will and the actual capacity of resources and skills
to  pursue  different  courses  of  action,  is  to  risk  the  shallow  and  laminated
homogenisation of today’s consumer democracy. Bellamy and Taylor (1998:99)
draw our attention to the numerous limitations and the risk we run of consumer
democracy restricting citizenship to stake-holding in public services where public
information is only accessible in relation to the citizen’s stake in the delivery of
public  services.  The over-reliance on the consumption nexus to interpret and
11 See Held (1996: 13-15) for the intrinsic value of participation to classical notions of democracy.
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moderate individual consumer preferences neglects the possibility that citizens
might engage with others. It denies that individual choice might be moderated
by the political interactions and engagement with other citizens who may have
equally powerful and rational preferences to express.
The  worrying  paradox  in  the  scenario  of  apathy  becoming  beneficial  to  a
democratic  system  is  that  those  who  are  the  worst  off,  the  alienated,  the
marginalised and the disenfranchised are the people most prejudiced by having
nothing to do with politics. However, the hostility to intervention or redistribution
inscribed in liberal thought permeates contemporary models of democracy that
are predicated on a protecting negative liberty and the juridical political equality
of the isolated sovereign individual. Therefore even those embarrassed by the
social,  economic,  cultural  and  environmental  consequences  of  late  modern
capitalism are in paralysis.  As for the prospects of democratic autonomy, the
arrangements of contemporary democracy are now so wedded to and collude
with capitalist transformation as to be like the victim and accomplice in a perfect
crime. What to do?
Re-igniting Democracy
“The happening of the event is what cannot and should not be prevented: it is
another name for the future itself. Not that it is good – good in itself.”
Jacques Derrida
“To know where the other person makes a mistake is of little value. It only
becomes interesting when you know where you make the mistake, for then you
can do something about it. What we can improve in others is of doubtful utility
as a rule, if, indeed, it has any effect at all.”
Carl Gustav Jung
If stability and order depends on apathy or a subservient passive citizenry then
there  would  seem little  reason for  citizens  to  identify  with  the  needs  of  the
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current system of arrangements. An expansion of what it is possible for us to
think is an act of the democratic imagination. It is the faculty that ignites and
transforms the experience of what is into a future of what could be. However the
democratic dilemma is to move beyond dogmatic notions of thought as purely
the propositional production of knowledge for the direct solution of problems.
New formulations and concepts are needed that allow us to extend, re-imagine
and re-perceive the world and our relationship to it. A challenge that calls for a
more  mindful  appreciation  of  the  underlying  influences  and  structures  that
control our lives from without whilst  remaining aware of the discrete impacts
they  have  on our  emotional  or  inner  being.  They  all  in  turn effect  our  own
perceptions, words, and actions. 
If the transformation of democracy is undertaken in different ways to articulate
interests,  purposes,  needs and visions of the ‘good-life’  then the invention of
democracy  is  a  practical  historical  experience.  It  impacts  on  living,  thinking,
feeling people with referents being constructed, accumulated and learnt. Western
understandings of democracy themselves have always and already gone through
a process  of  multiplication,  contestation,  destabilisation  and differentiation.  It
would  be  to  deny  western  countries’  development  of  their  own  individually
specific democratic institutions, practices and political culture not to realise that
the ad-hoc inventions and spontaneous improvisations that emerged over time
themselves settled. The latter inventions and improvisations eventually emerging
as  particular  sets  of  referable  institutional  arrangements,  political  culture  and
practice called democracy.  The impossibility of fixing the idea of democracy with
definite signifieds and unchanging referents should fill us with anticipation. As
Derrida  notes,  “democracy  is  a  promise.  That  is  why  it  is  more  a  historical
concept  of  the  political  -  it’s  the  only  concept  of  a  regime  or  a  political
organisation  in  which  history,  that  endless  process  of  improvement  and
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perfectibility, is inscribed in the concept. So it’s a historical concept through and
through, and that is why I call it ‘to-come’” (1997:5).
The concern to a vast majority of people is whether they themselves have the
genuine opportunity and capacity to utilise or engage the democratic institutions
that are supposed to emerge out of a democratic polity. The dynamic processes
of free speech, conscience and thought that compose, publicise and reproduce
referents for a democratic polity by the people who live there remains a crucial
expression of the implied condition of democracy. It gives a sense of shape, time
and  place  to  abstract  and  amorphous  aspirations.  However,  the  symbolic
experiences and public space of democratic struggle that allow people to look
and walk through a ‘living’ democracy are becoming commodified. Deontological
conceptions  of  ‘the  good-life’  configured  around  individual  consumerism
articulate no actual context within which the democratic imagination flourishes
through an open and continued deliberation.12  The embodiment of  collective
memory is  allowed to atrophy and the symbolic  space of  democratic  identity
formation dissipates. 
As mentioned, with an unanchored metaphysics it is impossible to stabilise any
attempt  to  fix  a  normative  construction  of  something  that  is  immanently
unstable. However, merely because something is ‘Sisyphean’ does not mean it
necessarily  has  to  be  abandoned.  If  democracy  is  to  have  a  continued
significance it should come to people as a self-educating process and struggle
that provides  the genuine opportunity to learn,  define and build  by them.  It
would be antithetical to any democracy worthy of the name to claim ownership
12 See  Berman (1983) and Jameson (1991). Modernity is intimately entwined the dissemination
and imbrication of ‘democracy’. The major transmissions have not occurred through traditional
means of communication, oral or written but through an emergent capitalist cultural market in
the shape of commodities (books,  journals,  magazines) and mass communication (television,
internet) that tends to advance a promulgated commodification of ‘democracy’ as promiscuous as
it is subtle. The idea of an active democratic citizen becomes distorted into political passivity
incapable of speaking its name.
Dialogue (2005) 3:2 99
of  the  single  definitive  democracy.  The  very  processes  of  ‘attempting’  or
‘becoming’  engenders  the  conditions  of  possibility  for  progressive,  genuine
change for the better by providing the symbolic  space of  democratic  identity
formation. Not a destination or place but a process that only begins again when
you arrive. The  democratic project is therefore without ultimate solution. This
may appear at first a ridiculously frustrating and perplexing challenge. However I
am inexplicably  reminded  of  an  optimistic  quote on  the  human condition  by
Gregory Bateson (1972: 4), “if  a man achieves or suffers change in premises
which are deeply embedded in his mind, he will surely find that the results of
that change will ramify throughout his whole universe”. 
What Bateson was positing was a radical  transformation of  self  that involves
revolutions in the mind without the use of violence, whilst consuming less and
engendering an enriched sense of self-actualisation in one’s own life. Awareness
and compassion towards others is the only ‘universal’ posited and is more a gift
of vibrant generosity than imposition. The welcome is for all with the hope of
facilitating  a  translation  into  a  practical  politics  and  ethics.  An  open-ended
dialogue that invites people to compare, contrast and learn about each other’s
achievements and shortcomings. In so doing, we learn from others as they learn
from us in an authentic and non-violent way; freedom perhaps?
Paul J Carnegie is a PhD candidate in the School of Political Science and
International Studies at The University of Queensland.
Dialogue (2005) 3:2 100
Dialogue (2005) 3:2 101
Selected Bibliography
Adorno, T. & Horkheimer, M. ([1947] 1979). Dialectic of Entertainment. New
York, Herder & Herder.
Bachrach, P. (1968). The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique. Boston, Little
Brown.
Bateson, G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind. New York, Ballantine Books.
Bellamy, C & Taylor, J. A. (1998). Governing in the Information Age.
Buckingham, Open University Press.
Berman, M. (1983). All that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity.
London, Verso.
Bermeo, N. (1990). Rethinking Regime Change Comparative Politics 22: 359-77. 
Boas, F. (1988). Race, Language, and Culture. Chicago, University of Chicago
Press. 
Carothers, T. (2002). The End of the Transition Paradigm.  Journal of Democracy
13(1): 5-21.
Dahl, R. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, Yale
University Press.
Deleuze, G. (1993). The Fold. trans. Conley, T. Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota Press.
Dialogue (2005) 3:2 102
Deleuze, G. (1987). The Logic of Sense. trans. Lester, M. New York, Columbia
University Press.
Deleuze, G. & Guattari F. (1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and
Schizophrenia. trans. Massumi, B. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
Derrida, J. (1992). The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe. trans.
Brault, P &  Naas, M. Bloomington, Indiana University Press.
De Tocqueville, A. ([1824] 1972). De la Democratie en Amerique. Paris, Seghers.
Foucault M. (1980). Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings,
1972-1977. trans. & ed. Gordon, C. New York, Pantheon Books.
Hamilton, C. (2003). Growth Fetish. Crows Nest, Allen & Unwin. 
Held, D. (1996). Models of Democracy. Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Jameson, F. (1991). Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.
London, Verso.
Laclau, E & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a
Radical Democratic Politics. London, Verso.
Lijphart, A. (1975). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration.
New York, Vail-Ballou Press. 
Madison, J ([1787] 1961). Federalist No.10. in The Federalist Papers, Rossiter, C.
ed. New York, New American Library.
Marcuse, H. (1968). One Dimensional Man. London, Sphere. 
Dialogue (2005) 3:2 103
Michels, R. ([1915] 1959). Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the
Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. Eden & Cedar Paul. New
York, Dover Publications. 
Mouffe, C. (1988). “Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Towards a New
Concept of Democracy.” In Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Nelson, C.
& Grossberg, L. eds. Urbana, University of Illinois Press.
Paehlke, R.C. (2003). Democracy’s Dilemma: Environment, Social Equity and the
Global Economy. Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press. 
Pennock, J. (1979). Democratic Political Theory. New Jersey, Princeton University
Press.
Saussure, F. d., C. Bally, et al. (1949). Cours de linguistique generale. Paris,
Payot.
Schumpeter, J. (1943). Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy. London, Allen &
Unwin.   
Smith, A. ([1779] 1950). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations. London, Methuen.
Ricardo, D. ([1817] 1911). The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.
London, Dent.
Weber, M. ([1927] 1968). Economy and Society Vols.1-3, trans. Fischoff, E. in
Roth, G & Wittich, C. eds. New York, Bedminster Press.
Dialogue (2005) 3:2 104
